Yemen after 10 years of Houthi presence

It is astonishing to think that the Houthis have maintained control over parts of Yemen, including the capital Sana’a, for an entire decade. This situation has become an unavoidable reality requiring acknowledgment and response. It also highlights the Houthi movement’s growth in Yemen and its close ties with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

This further underscores Iran’s adeptness at capitalizing on the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab region to further its own ambitions. Yemen, where the Muslim Brotherhood orchestrated a coup against Ali Abdullah Saleh, stands as a prime example of Iran’s strategic manipulation and exploitation of opportunities to infiltrate crucial Arab nations like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, with the intent of destabilizing them from within. 

This political entity now serves as a strategic foothold for Iran in the Arabian Peninsula, functioning as an Iranian military base in one of the ongoing conflicts prosecuted by the Islamic Republic. Through its maneuvers in the Yemen conflict and its involvement in Gaza, Iran aims to demonstrate to the world, especially the United States, that it holds the decisive influence in the region. 

On this day in 2014, the Houthis were advancing on Sana’a after conquering the ‘Amran Governorate, a region where the remnants of the Yemeni army were expected to make a stand. They successfully dismantled the influence of the Al-Ahmar family, leaders of the Hashid—a once-significant Yemeni tribe whose importance waned after the death of Sheikh Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar in 2007. Subsequently, the Houthis neutralized the 310th Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Hameed Al-Qushaibi, reputedly one of the best-equipped units in the Yemeni army. 

This occurred with the tacit approval of the interim president at the time, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Hadi made a point to visit the 310th Brigade’s headquarters immediately following its defeat by Ansar Allah, mistakenly believing he could rally their support to stabilize his precarious position. He failed to grasp that the Houthis, backed by Iranian strategy, had long-range plans dating back to the overthrow Saleh’s regime, culminating in his resignation in February 2012 and the subsequent accession of his deputy to the presidency. 

Long before the coup against Ali Abdullah Saleh, the world exhibited a persistent underestimation of the Houthi threat, which is intrinsically an Iranian threat. The focus remained on al-Qaida, which, while undeniably dangerous, was not a threat of greater magnitude than the evolving Houthi movement—especially from the moment Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted until the fall of Sana’a and the concurrent takeover of Al Hudaydah Port on the Red Sea.